A mathematical model for behavioral changes by pair interactions (i.e. due to direct contact) of individuals is developed. Three kinds of pair interactions can be distinguished: Imitative processes, avoidance processes, and compromising processes. Representative solutions of the model for two different interacting subpopulations are illustrated by computational results.
Introduction
This paper treats a mathematical model for the change of the fraction P (i, t) of individuals who show a certain behavior i. Models of this kind are of great interest for a quantitative understanding or prognosis of social developments. For the description of the competition or cooperation of populations there already exist game theoretical approaches (see, for example, Mueller (1990) , Axelrod (1984) , von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Luce and Raiffa (1957) ). However, the model devoloped in this paper shows to be more general, since it includes as special cases
• not only the game dynamical equations (Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) ), but also
• the logistic equation (Verhulst (1845) , Pearl (1924) , Helbing (1992) ),
• the Gravity model (Ravenstein (1876), Zipf (1946) ),
• the Lotka-Volterra equations (Lotka (1920 (Lotka ( , 1956 , Volterra (1931) , Hofbauer (1981) , Goel et. al. (1971) , Hallam (1986) , Goodwin (1967) ), and
• the quantitative social models of Weidlich and Haag (Weidlich & Haag (1983 , Weidlich (1991) ).
This model assumes behavioral changes to occur with a certain probability per time unit, called the transition rate. The transition rate is decomposed into
• a rate describing spontaneous behavioral changes, and
• a rate describing behavioral changes due to pair interactions of individuals.
Three different kinds of pair interactions can be distinguished:
• First, imitative processes, which describe the tendency to take over the behavior of another individual.
• Second, avoidance processes, causing an individual to change the behavior if meeting another individual with the same behavior.
• Third, compromising processes, which describe the readiness to change the behavior to a new one when meeting an individual with another behavior.
Representative solutions of the model are illustrated by computer simulations. By distinguishing several subpopulations a, different types of behavior can be taken into account.
As one would expect, there is a connection of this model with the game dynamical equations. In order to establish this connection, the transition rates have to be taken in a special way which depends on the expected success of the behavioral strategies. The essential effect is given by imitative processes.
A stochastic formulation of the game dynamic equations shows that the ordinary game dynamical equations result as equations for the most probable behavioral distribution or as approximate mean value equations.
For the approximate mean values corrections can be calculated. These corrections depend on the (co)variances σ ij of the numbers n i of individuals who show a certain behavior i. The calculation of the (co)variances is also useful to determine the reliability of game theoretical descriptions.
An example of two equivalent competing strategies serves as an illustration of the game dynamical equations and their stochastic version. It allows the description of the selforganization of a behavioral convention.
The master equation
Suppose, we have a social system with N individuals. These individuals can be divided into A subpopulations a consisting of N a individuals, i.e.,
By subpopulations different social groups (e.g. blue and white collars) or different characteristic types of behavior are distinguished.
The N a individuals of each subpopulation a are distributed over several states i ∈ {1, . . . , S} , which represent the behavior or the (behavioral) strategy of an individual. If the occupation number n a i denotes the number of individuals of subpopulation a who show the behavior i, we have the relation
Let
be the vector consisting of all occupation numbers n a i . This vector is called the socioconfiguration, since it contains all information about the distribution of the N individuals over the states i. P (n, t) shall denote the probability to find the socioconfiguration n at time t. This implies 0 ≤ P (n, t) ≤ 1 and n P (n, t) = 1 .
If transitions from socioconfiguration n to n ′ occur with a probability of P (n ′ , t + ∆t|n, t) during a short time interval ∆t, we have a (relative) transition rate of
The absolute transition rate of changes from n to n ′ is the product w(n ′ , n; t)P (n, t) of the probability P (n, t) to have the configuration n and the relative transition rate w(n ′ , n; t) if having the configuration n. Whereas the inflow into n is given as the sum over all absolute transition rates of changes from an arbitrary configuration n ′ to n, the outflow from n is given as the sum over all absolute transition rates of changes from n to another configuration n ′ . Since the temporal change of the probability P (n, t) is determined by the inflow into n reduced by the outflow from n, we find the master equation
(see Haken (1983) ), which is a stochastic equation.
It shall be assumed that two processes contribute to a change of the socioconfiguration n:
• Individuals may change their behavior i spontaneously and independently of each other to another behavior i ′ with an individual transition rate w a (i ′ , i; t). These changes correspond to transitions of the socioconfiguration from n to
with a configurational transition rate w(n a i ′ i , n; t) = n a i w a (i ′ , i; t), which is proportional to the number n a i of individuals who can change the behavior i.
• An individual of subpopulation a may change the behavior from i to i ′ during a pair interaction with an individual of a subpopulation b who changes the behavior from j to j ′ . Let transitions of this kind occur with a probability w ab (i ′ , j ′ ; i, j; t) per time unit. The corresponding change of the socioconfiguration from n to
leads to a configurational transition rate w(n ab i ′ j ′ ij , n; t) = n a i n b j w ab (i ′ , j ′ ; i, j; t), which is proportional to the number n a i n b j of possible pair interactions between individuals of subpopulations a resp. b who show the behavior i resp. j. (Exactly speakingin order to exclude self-interactionsn a i n a i w aa (i ′ , j ′ ; i, i; t) has to be replaced by n a i (n a i − 1) w aa (i ′ , j ′ ; i, i; t), if P (n, t) is not negligible where n a i ≫ 1 does not hold, and
The resulting configurational transition rate w(n ′ , n; t) is given by w(n ′ , n; t)
As a consequence, the explicit form of the master equation (2) is
(see Helbing (1992a) ).
Most probable and expected behavioral distribution
Because of the great number of possible socioconfigurations n, the master equation for the determination of the configurational distribution P (n, t) is usually difficult to solve (even with a computer). However,
• in cases of the description of single or rare social processes the most probable behavioral distribution
is the quantity of interest, whereas
• in cases of frequently occuring social processes the interesting quantity is the expected behavioral distribution
Equations for the most probable occupation numbers n a i (t) can be deduced from a Langevin equation for the development of the socioconfiguration n(t). For the mean values n a i t of the occupation numbers n a i only approximate closed equations can be derived. A measure for the reliability (or representativity) of n a i (t) and n a i t with respect to the possible temporal developments of n a i (t) are the (co)variances σ ab ij (t) of n a i (t).
Mean value and (co)variance equations
The mean value of a function f (n, t) is defined by
It can be shown that the mean values of the occupation numbers f (n, t) = n a i are determined by the equations
with the drift coefficients
and the effective transition rates
(see Helbing (1992a) ). Obviously, the contributions w ab (i ′ , j ′ ; i, j; t)n b j due to pair interactions are proportional to the number n b j of possible interaction partners.
Approximate mean value and (co)variance equations
Equations (4) are no closed equations, since they depend on the mean values n a i n b j , which are not determined by (4). However, if the configurational distribution P (n, t) has only small (co)variances
we find in first order Taylor approximation the approximate mean value equations
In many cases, the initial configuration n 0 at time t 0 is known by a measurement, i.e., the initial distribution is
where the Kronecker function δ xy is defined by
As a consequence, the (co)variances σ ab ij vanish at time t 0 and remain small during a certain time interval. For the temporal development of σ ab ij , the equations
can be found. Here,
. (10) are diffusion coefficients (see Helbing (1992a) ). Equations (9) are, again, no closed equations. However, a first order Taylor approximation of the coefficients m .. .. (n, t) leads to the equations
(see Helbing (1992a) ), which are solvable together with (8). The approximate (co)variance equations (11) allow the determination of the time interval during which the approximate mean value equations (8) are valid (see figures 3a and 3b). They are also useful for the calculation of the reliability (or representativity) of descriptions made by (8).
Corrected mean value and (co)variance equations
Equations (8) and (11) are only valid for the case σ
where the absolute values of the (co)variances σ ab ij are small, i.e., where the configurational distribution P (n, t) is sharply peaked.
For increasing (co)variances, a better approximation of (4), (9) should be taken. A second order Taylor approximation results in the corrected mean value equations
and the corrected (co)variance equations
Note, that the corrected mean value equations explicitly depend on the (co)variances σ ab ij , i.e., on the fluctuations due to the stochasticity of the processes described! They cannot be solved without solving the (co)variance equations. However, the calculation of the (co)variances is always recommendable, since they are a measure for the reliability (or representativity) of the mean value equations.
A comparison of exact, approximate and corrected mean value and variance equations is given in figures 1 to 3. A citerium for the validity of (8) and (11) resp. (13) and (14) are the relative central moments
Whereas the approximate equations (8), (11) already fail, if
is violated for m = 2 (compare to (12), (7)), the corrected equations (13), (14) only presuppose (15) for 2 < m ≤ l with a certain value l (see Helbing (1992a)). However, even the corrected equations (13), (14) become useless, if the probability distribution P (n, t) becomes multimodal.
Figures 1 to 3 show computational results corresponding to the example of section 5.3.
Exact mean values n 1 and variances σ 11 are represented by solid lines, whereas approximate results according to (8), (11) are represented by dotted lines, and corrected results according to (13), (14) by broken lines. As expected, the corrected mean value equations yield better results than the approximate mean value equations.
Figure 1: Exact (-), approximate (· · ·) and corrected (--) mean values (upper curves) and variances (lower curves) for a small configurational distribution P (n, t): Both, approximate and corrected equations are applicable. As figure 1, but for a multimodal configurational distribution: Not only the approximate but also the corrected equations fail after a certain time interval. However, whereas the approximate mean value and variance become unreliable already for t > 1, the corrected mean value and variance remain valid until t > 3.
Figure 3b: The relative central moments are a criterium for the validity of the approximate resp. the corrected mean value and (co)variance equations: If |C2| (-) exceeds the value 0.04, the approximate equations fail, whereas the corrected equations fail, if |C3| (--) or |C4| (· · ·) exceed the value 0.04.
Equations for the most probable behavioral distribution
The master equation (2) can be reformulated in terms of a Langevin equation (see Helbing (1992)):
The Langevin equation (16) describes the behavior of the socioconfiguration n(t) in dependence of process immanent fluctuations (that are determined by the diffusion coefficients m ab ij ). As a consequence,
are the equations for the most probable occupation numbers n a i (t). The equations (17) look exactly like the approximate mean value equations (8). Therefore, if N ≫ 1, the approximate mean value equations (8) have an interpretation even for great variances, since they also describe the most probable behavioral distribution.
Kinds of pair interactions
The pair interactions
of two individuals of subpopulations a resp. b who change their behavior from i resp. j to i ′ resp. j ′ can be completely classified according to the following scheme:
Obviously, the interpretation of the above kinds k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4} of pair interactions is the following:
(0) During interactions of kind (0) both individuals do not change their behavior. These interactions can be omitted in the following, since they have no contribution to the change of P (n, t) or n a i (t).
(1) The interactions (1) describe imitative processes (processes of persuasion), i.e., the tendency to take over the behavior of another individual.
(2) The interactions (2) describe avoidance processes, where an individual changes the behavior when meeting another individual showing the same behavior. Processes of this kind are known as aversive behavior, defiant behavior or snob effect.
(3) The interactions (3) represent some kind of compromising processes, where an individual changes the behavior to a new one (the "compromise") when meeting an individual with another behavior. Such processes are found, if a certain behavior cannot be maintained when confronted with another behavior.
(4) The interactions (4) describe imitative processes, in which an individual changes the behavior despite of the fact, that he or she convinces the interaction partner of his resp. her behavior. Processes of this kind are very improbable and shall be excluded in the following discussion.
For the transition rates corresponding to these kinds of interaction processes the following plausible form shall be assumed (see Helbing (1992) ):
Here,
is the contact rate between an individual of subpopulation a with individuals of subpopulation b. p k ab (j|i; t) is the probability of an individual of subpopulation a to change the behavior from i to j during a pair interaction of kind k with an individual of subpopulation b, i.e., j p k ab (j|i; t) = 1 .
Let us assume
where f k ab (t) is a measure for the frequency of pair interactions of kind k between individuals of subpopulation a and b, and R a (j, i; t) is a measure for the readiness of individuals belonging to subpopulation a to change the behavior from i to j during a pair interaction. Inserting the rate (18) of pair interactions into (6) and using the conventions
we arrive at the approximate mean value equations
(see (8), (5)) with the mean transition rates
(if N a ≫ 1; see Helbing (1992 Helbing ( , 1992b ). The mean transition rates include contributions of spontaneous behavioral changes, and of behavioral changes due to pair interactions (i.e., of imitative, avoidance and compromising processes). (20), (21) are Boltzmannlike equations (see Boltzmann (1964), Helbing (1992a)).
Due to (1), (19), and 0 ≤ n a i ≤ N a we have the relations i P a (i, t) = 1 and 0 ≤ P a (i, t) ≤ 1 . Therefore, P a (i, t) can be interpreted as the fraction of individuals within subpopulation a who show the behavior i. With respect to the total population, the fraction P (i, t) of individuals with behavior i is given by
Computer simulations
For an illustration of the Boltzmann-like equations (20), (21) we shall assume to have two subpopulations (A = 2), and three different behaviors (S = 3). With
(see Weidlich and Haag (1988), Helbing (1992)) the readiness R a (i ′ , i; t) for an individual of subpopulation a to change the behavior from i to i ′ will be the greater, the greater the difference of the utilities U a (., t) of behaviors i ′ and i is, and the smaller the incompatibility ("distance")
between the behaviors i and i ′ is.
In the following computer simulations D a (i ′ , i; t) ≡ 1 has been taken. For both subpopulations the prefered behavior, i.e., the behavior with the greatest utility U a (i, t) is represented by a solid line, whereas the behavior with the lowest utility is represented by a dotted line, and the behavior with medium utility by a broken line. Figures 4a  to 6b show the effects of imitative processes
ab (t)), resp. of compromising and imitative processes (ν 3
In more complicated cases, there are also oscillatory or chaotic behavioral changes possible, as illustrated in figures 7 (see Helbing (1992b Helbing ( , 1992 ) and 8 (see Helbing (1992) ). The prefered behavior (-) becomes the predominating one in each subpopulation, but the behavior which is prefered in the other subpopulation (--) can also convince a certain fraction of individuals. A behavior which is not prefered by any subpopulation (· · ·) vanishes. 
Game dynamical equations
In game theory, i denotes a (behavioral) strategy. Let E a (i, t) be the expected success of a strategy i for an individual of subpopulation a, and
the mean expected success. If the relative increase dP a (i, t)/dt P a (i, t)
of the fraction P a (i, t) is assumed to be proportional to the difference [E a (i, t) − E a ] between the expected and the mean expected success, one obtains the game dynamical equations
(23) That means, the fractions of strategies with an expected success that exceeds the average E a are growing, whereas the fractions of the remaining strategies are falling. For the expected success E a (i, t), one often takes the form
where A ab (i, j; t) have the meaning of payoffs. We shall assume
where r ab (t) is the relative contact rate of an individual of subpopulation a with individuals of subpopulation b, and E ab (i, j; t) is the success of strategy i for an individual of subpopulation a during an interaction with an individual of subpopulation b who uses strategy j. Since r ab (t)P b (j, t) is the relative contact rate of an individual of subpopulation a with individuals of subpopulation b who use strategy j, E a (i, t) is the mean (or expected) success of strategy i for an individual of subpopulation a in interactions with other individuals.
By inserting (24) and
into (23), one obtains the explicit form
of the game dynamical equations. (25) is a continuous formulation of game theory (see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) ). Equations of this kind are very useful for the investigation and understanding of the competition or cooperation of individuals (see, e.g., Mueller (1990) , Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), Schuster et. al. (1981) ).
A slightly generalized form of (23),
is also known as selection mutation equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) ): (26b) can be understood as effect of a selection (if E a (i, t) is interpreted as fitness of strategy i), and (26a) can be understood as effect of mutations. Equation (26) is a powerful tool in evolutionary biology (see Eigen (1971 ), Fisher (1930 , Eigen and Schuster (1979) (1989) ). In game theory, the mutation term could be used for the description of trial and error behavior or of accidental variations of the strategy.
Connection between Boltzmann-like and game dynamical equations
One expects that there must be a connection between the Boltzmann-like equations (20), (21) and the game dynamical equations (26), since they are both quantitative models for behavioral changes. A comparison of (20), (21) with (26) shows, that both models can become identical only under the conditions
That means, the game dynamical equations include spontaneous and imitative behavioral changes, but they exlude avoidance and compromising processes.
In order to make the analogy between the game dynamical and the Boltzmann-like equations complete the following assumptions have to be made:
• In interactions with other individuals the expected success
of a strategy is evaluated. This is possible, since an individual is able to determine the quantities ν ab (t), P b (j, t) and E ab (i, j; t): An individual of subpopulation a meets individuals of subpopulation b with a contact rate of ν ab (t). With a probability of P b (j, t), the individuals of subpopulation b use the strategy j.
During interactions with individuals of subpopulation b who use the strategy j, an individual of subpopulation a has a success of E ab (i, j; t) if using the strategy i.
• In interactions with individuals of the same subpopulation an individual tends to take over the strategy of another individual, if the expected success would increase: If an individual who uses a strategy i meets another individual of the same subpopulation who uses a strategy j, they will compare their expected success' E a (i, t) resp. E a (j, t) (by observation or exchange of their experiences). The individual with strategy i will imitate the other's strategy j with a probability p 1 ab (j|i; t) that is growing with the expected increase
of success. If a change of strategy would imply a decrease of success (∆ ji E a < 0), the individual will not change the strategy i. Therefore, the readiness for replacing the strategy i by j during an interaction within the same subpopulation can be assumed to be
where max(x, y) is the maximum of the two numbers x and y. However, due to different criteria for the grade of success, the expected success of a strategy i will usually be varying with the subpopulation a (i.e., E a (i, t) = E b (i, t) for a = b). As a consequence, an imitative behavior of individuals belonging to different subpopulations is not plausible, and we shall assume
Inserting (27), (28) and (29) into the Boltzmann-like equations (20), (21), the game dynamical equations (26) result as a special case, since
Stochastic version of the game dynamical equations
Applying the formalism of section 2, a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations can easily be formulated. This is given by the master equation (2) with the configurational transition rates (3) and
where and Ebeling (1989) , Ebeling and Feistel (1982), Ebeling et. al. (1990) ). A comparison with (8), (20), (21) shows, that the ordinary game dynamical equations (26) are the approximate mean value equations of this special master equation. Therefore, they can only be interpreted as mean value equations as long as the (co)variances σ ab ij are small (see (12)). Otherwise they describe the most probable behavioral distribution (see sect. 3.2).
Selforganization of behavioral conventions by competition between equivalent strategies
This section gives an illustration of the methods and results derived in sections 5 and 5.2.
As an example, we shall consider a case with one subpopulation only (A = 1), and, therefore, omit the index a in the following. Let us suppose the individuals to choose between two equivalent strategies i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., the payoff matrix A(t) shall be symmetrical:
(30) According to the relation n 1 + n 2 = N (see (1)), the fraction P (2, t) = 1 − P (1, t) is already determined by P (1, t) . By scaling the time, ν(t) ≡ 1 can be presupposed. For the spontaneous change of strategies due to trial and error we shall assume the transition rates
A situation of the above kind is the avoidance behavior of pedestrians (see Helbing (1991) ): In pedestrian crowds with two opposite directions of movement, the pedestrians have sometimes to avoid each other in order to exclude a collision. For an avoidance maneuver to be successful, both pedestrians concerned have to pass the respective other pedestrian either on the right hand side or on the left hand side. Otherwise, both pedestrians have to stop (see figure 9 ). Therefore, both strategies (to pass pedestrians on the right hand side or to pass them on the left hand side) are equivalent, but the success of a strategy grows with the number n i of individuals who use the same strategy. In the payoff matrix (30) we have A > 0, then.
The game dynamical equations (26) corresponding to (30), (31) have the explicit form
According to (32), P (i) = 1/2 is a stationary solution. This solution is stable only for
Figure 9: For pedestrians with an opposite direction of motion it is advantageous, if both prefer either the right hand side or the left hand side when trying to pass each other. Otherwise, they would have to stop in order to avoid a collision. The probability P (1) for choosing the right hand side is usually greater than the probability P (2) = 1 − P (1) for choosing the left hand side.
i.e., if spontaneous strategy changes due to trial and error (the "mutations") are dominating. For κ > 0 the stationary solution P (i) = 1/2 is unstable, and the game dynamical equations (32) can be rewritten in the form d dt P (i, t) = −2 P (i, t) − 1 2
That means, for κ > 0 we have two additional stationary solutions P (i) = (1+ √ κ)/2 and P (i) = (1 − √ κ)/2, which are stable.
Depending on the random initial condition P (i, t 0 ), one strategy will win a majority of 100· √ κ percent. This majority is the greater, the smaller the rate W of spontaneous strategy changes is.
At the critical point κ = κ 0 := 0 there appears a phase transition. This can be seen best in figures 10 to 12, where the distribution P (n, t) ≡ P (n 1 , n 2 ; t) = P (n 1 , N −n 1 ; t) loses its unimodal form for κ > 0. As a consequence of the phase transition, one strategy is prefered, i.e. a behavioral convention develops.
Figure 10: Probability distribution P (n, t) ≡ P ( n1 , N − n1 ; t ) of the socioconfiguration n = (n1, N − n1) for two equivalent competing strategies. Mutation dominated region (κ < 0): Since P (n1, N − n1; t) has, after a certain time interval, one maximimum at n1 = N/2, each strategy will most probably be used by about one half of the individuals.
Figure 11: As figure 10, but for the critical point κ = 0: The broadness of the probability distribution P (n1, N − n1; t) indicates critical fluctuations, i.e., a phase transition.
Figure 12: As figure 10, but after the phase transition (κ > 0): The configurational distribution P (n1, N − n1; t) becomes multimodal with maxima that are symmetrical with respect to N/2, because of the equivalence of the strategies. Due to the maxima at n1 > N/2 and n2 = N − n1 > N/2, one of the strategies will very probably win a majority of users. This implies the selforganization of a behavioral convention.
Figure 13: As figure 11, but with a modified ansatz for the readiness Ra(j, i; t) to change the behavior from i to j, which does not produce a crease of P (n1, N − n1; t) at N/2.
The crease of P (n 1 , N −n 1 ; t) at n 1 = N/2 = n 2 is a consequence of the crease of the function R a (j, i; t) = max( E a (j, t)− E a (i, t), 0). It can be avoided by using the modified ansatz R a (j, i; t) := e Ea(j,t)− Ea(i,t) D a (j, i; t) (compare to (22)), which also shows a phase transition for κ = 0 (see figure 13 ).
Summary and Conclusions
A quite general model for behavioral changes has been developed, which takes into account spontaneous changes and changes due to pair interactions. Three kinds of pair interactions have been distinguished: imitative, avoidance and compromising processes. The game dynamical equations result for a special case of imitative processes. They can be interpreted as equations for the most probable behavioral distribution or as approximate mean value equations of a stochastic formulation of game theory. In order to determine the reliability (or representativity) of game dynamical descriptions, one has to evaluate the corresponding (co)variance equations.
